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Abstract 
While the current European integration regime focuses on ‘cultural diversity’ as either a challenge or 
an asset and takes an assimilative or multiculturalist direction, this paper looks beyond ‘diversity’ and 
challenges the prevalent perspective. By studying the integration of Syrian refugees in Egypt it aims at 
finding a new understanding to the integration process, other than one of cultural conflict. Six Syrian 
and Egyptian community workers are interviewed and a structure-actor analysis is conducted. With 
the help of scholars such as Sara Ahmed, Étienne Balibar, Engin Isin and Bridget Anderson, three 
structures are identified: a social structures that constructs the immigrated as Others, a class structure 
that pushes the immigrated towards economic exclusion and poverty, and a political structures that 
pushes the immigrated out of the political, with limited rights and opportunities. The paper finds that 
a new vocabulary on integration is needed: by perceiving integration as equality, the integration process 
is to be understood as a political struggle for rights in an unequal society. 
Keywords: integration, othering, racism, structures, equality, Egypt 
Number of words:  9 973 
  
2 
 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 Research question, aim and purpose ............................................................................................. 5 
1.1.1 Delimitations ........................................................................................................................... 5 
2 Theory ................................................................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Integration aims at equality ........................................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Structures and actors ..................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2.1 A social structure constructing a racial Other ......................................................................... 7 
2.2.2 The economic structure: a class-based society ....................................................................... 8 
2.2.3 Citizenship as a political structure .......................................................................................... 9 
2.2.4 Acts for integration, acts of citizenship ................................................................................. 10 
3 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 11 
3.1 A qualitative analysis of interview material ................................................................................. 11 
3.1.1 Reliability of informants ........................................................................................................ 12 
3.2 Abduction and the research process ........................................................................................... 12 
3.3 Studying structures ...................................................................................................................... 13 
3.3.1 Context and generalizability.................................................................................................. 13 
3.4 Operationalization of terms ......................................................................................................... 13 
4 Result .................................................................................................................................................. 15 
4.1 Social integration or othering? .................................................................................................... 15 
4.1.1 Struggling for integration, acting for othering ...................................................................... 16 
4.2 Integration and the class structure .............................................................................................. 17 
4.2.1 Integrating into the ‘right’ class ............................................................................................ 18 
4.3 Integration and the political......................................................................................................... 19 
4.3.1 Acts of citizenship ................................................................................................................. 21 
5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................................... 23 
5.1 Integration as a political struggle for rights ................................................................................. 23 
5.2 Structures, actors and the freedom of human............................................................................. 24 
5.3 Managing diversity has nothing to do with integration ............................................................... 25 
6 Resources ............................................................................................................................................ 26 
 
3 
 
1 Introduction 
As migration continues to be a constant feature of the globalized world, integration 
continues to be a constant subject of political debate and academic research that 
highlights immigrated populations’ difficulties with taking part in society. But on what 
presumptions are the debate, research and policy based? This paper questions the 
accuracy of an integration process of adoption, thankfulness and peaceful coexistence.  
Integration could apply to any integration between groups in a society, such as age 
groups, social classes or subcultures, but has come to be more associated with 
integration between immigrated and local members of society, which is the only 
integration that is examined in this study. A matter often discussed and studied (see 
for example Entzinger 2014 and Schinkel 2013) regarding integration it whether the 
immigrated are to integrate or assimilate, where integration is understood as a two-way 
process where new-comers are included in different parts of society and the diversity 
they bring is embraced, but assimilation means that the immigrated population adjusts 
to the local and adopts its culture, language, values, etcetera. The assumption is that if 
the immigrated just share these features with the local population, they will be 
integrated per se. Integration is seen as a process that – under the right circumstances – 
happens naturally. Accordingly, immigrant integration in several European states is 
more about making the immigrated adjust to the local population, than about 
integration (SOU 2006:79:58 ff).  
Among scholars of integration, immigrated persons’ identification to different 
cultures appears to be a popular theme, and the overall question for researchers – and 
policy makers – seems to be how diversity should be managed. It appears to me that 
this precondition for studying integration leads to nowhere. On the one hand, policies 
that aim at uniformity through assimilation are counted out as discriminatory to 
minorities (see, for example, SOU 2006:79). On the other hand, multiculturalist 
policies that aim to embrace diversity are criticized for reproducing stereotypes and 
tend to accept economic inequality and marginalization as translated into cultural 
differences, and give a disadvantage to minority population in redistribution policies; 
it has “exclusionary tendencies” (Entzinger 2014:696-705; Schinkel 2013:1144). 
Kamali et al argue that an integration strategy that is based on managing diversity 
legitimizes division between immigrated and local members of society, as it divides the 
population into an integrated local population, and a disintegrated immigrated 
population, and integration becomes the responsibility of the disintegrated. The local 
population is seen as carriers of a neutral culture, or no specific culture at all, while the 
immigrated carry exotic and different cultures: “because the current norms and 
conceptions divide ‘us’ from ‘the others’, ‘they’ will never become like ‘us’, but ‘they’ 
will constantly exist in a long process of struggling for integration [my translation]” 
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(SOU 2006:79: 60). Kamali et al explain that this strategy for integration – or even the 
idea of integration itself – is an expression of structural power, as the characteristics of 
the local population are made a norm, superior to the characteristics of the immigrated 
population(s) (SOU 2006:79: 58 ff; Kamali, 2006). While equality must be desired in 
integration policy, such a strategy does not enhance equality, it rather does the 
opposite. On the other hand, asymmetric access to society also substantiates power, 
whether the inequality is formally or informally practiced. Thus, inequality is not 
created only by the current integration regime. Kamali et al’s study – commissioned by 
the Swedish state – seems to have had little impact on integration policy or discourse, 
perhaps because of the complex contradiction that the very concept of integration 
contains: the immigrated and the local populations do not have equal access to society, 
but efforts to increase the immigrated’s possibility to access society also reconstruct 
inequality. 
The current integration regime appears to over-value ‘diversity’. Therefore, this 
paper studies the integration process in a context of ‘uniformity’. It studies the 
integration of Syrian refugees in Egypt, as the immigrated population in that case faces 
difficulties similar to those of immigrated populations in Europe, but there are no big 
differences in language, religion, ‘culture’, position in the global power order, etcetera. 
In such a context, assimilation of immigrants should not be relevant, and immigrants 
should not be exposed to structural power as described above.  
Yet, scholars before me have studied the reception of Syrian refugees in Egypt, 
and a quite clear picture of poor integration, expressed as discrimination and hostility, 
has been drawn. Ayoub & Khallaf (2014) have conducted focus group discussions with 
310 Syrian households and in-depth interviews with key persons from the Syrian 
community in different governorates to study their challenges in Egypt. The 
informants were originally well received by the Egyptians – some were even hosted in 
Egyptian homes for free – but the attitudes changed drastically during 2013, when the 
Muslim Brotherhood regime was overthrown by the army with great public support. 
Ayoub & Khallaf conducted interviews and focus group discussions both before and 
immediately after the regime shift, and noted a drastic change in the narratives of the 
refugees – some even reporting losing their jobs and rent contracts (p. 21). The 
respondents explained the attitude shift with the increasing number of Syrians arriving, 
the long duration of time they have stayed in Egypt, and accusations of Syrians being 
involved in Egyptian politics, supporting the ousted Muslim Brotherhood (p. 20). 
Ayoub & Khallaf’s findings highlight how division can be constructed through policy 
and politics, and how diversity is not necessarily a precondition. 
Furthermore, the knowledge of how integration works in non-western countries 
appears to be limited, despite the fact that most refugees do not end up in the west 
(UNHCR 2015b). 
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1.1 Research question, aim and purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to further investigate the integration process, by studying 
integration in a context where one explaining variable – ‘diversity’ – can be counted 
out. By studying integration in a non-western context I aim to seek new perspectives 
that could solve some of the confusion that for the time being seems to limit the 
research field. 
My research question is: 
How should the integration process of Syrian refugees in Egypt be understood? 
I seek to understand the integration process by identifying the obstacles for integration, 
and the efforts made to overcome them. I use a structure-actor model to distinguish 
between actors and the structures within which they act. In the following chapter I 
review previous findings and theoretical explanations to why immigrated members of 
society can be excluded from social life, economic opportunities and the political 
sphere. In chapter three, I present my methodological choices and the strategy for the 
empirical study conducted in Egypt. In the fourth chapter I present the result of the 
empirical study and apply the theoretical explanations on the empirical material. The 
fifth and last chapter serves to conclude my findings and argument. 
1.1.1 Delimitations 
This is a study of Syrian refugees living in Egypt. It does not examine other refugee 
populations in Egypt, even if other nationalities are represented among the refugee 
population. The Syrian refugees that I interview are their own spokespersons, and I do 
not review or judge Egyptian immigration or integration policy, or UNHCR’s support 
for refugees in Egypt, except when they are brought up by the informants. I also have 
limited possibility to judge whether my understanding of the integration process can 
be applied on a European context; I leave the European case(s) to be studied by future 
scholars. 
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2 Theory  
To be able to distinguish between structures and actors, I need a theoretical framework 
that defines structures. It should be noted that structures are nothing but theoretical 
constructions. Neither the class structure, social structure or any structure at all, are 
‘real’ in the meaning that they can be touched or measured (Hollis 1994). Hence, the 
structures outlined in this or analyzed in the following chapters, should be understood 
only as tools to help us understand social processes. 
This chapter will also discuss the meaning of an ‘act’ and – first of all – the meaning 
of integration. 
2.1 Integration aims at equality 
There is no juridical definition to the term ‘integration’, but Crisp (2014) regards 
integration as “a process which leads to a durable situation for refugees”, and points 
out that this includes a formal process, where new-comers obtain rights and access to 
public institutions, as well as a social dimension, which refers to access to the social 
life of society. However, I find this definition insufficient, as many countries with great 
problems with integration probably offer a situation for refugees that is ‘durable’. In 
fact, refugees could face discrimination in all forms and stand outside all markets in a 
rich country, but still have a ‘durable situation’. Accordingly, refugees could 
(theoretically) be totally integrated in a poor country, and still not have a ‘durable 
situation’. Hopkins (2011:21) claims that “real integration equates to recapturing a level 
of life one enjoyed prior to flight”, a definition that makes little sense for refugees and 
migrants that flee poor living conditions. The aim of the integration process could not 
solely be a ‘durable situation’, neither recapturing the previous living standard, but for 
the immigrated to obtain rights and a living standard as good (or bad) as that of (other) 
citizens. The conclusion must be that the integration process aims at equality. 
Accordingly, a society characterized by inequality or discrimination towards its 
immigrated members has failed to fully integrate them. 
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2.2 Structures and actors 
There is a divide within the social sciences where some see the individual as totally 
independent of any structural influence and others regard the individual an unfree 
result of her social context. However, most scholars recognize some degree of both 
independence and influence, and according to Lundquist (1984:1-4), both actors and 
the (social) structure within which they act, are necessary to study when analyzing 
political phenomenon. Hollis (1994:6) points out that the conflicting perspectives also 
regard whether “structure determine action or action determine structure?” – a 
question which comes down to what makes social change. 
A structure-actor model is an analytical tool that recognizes both actors and 
structures as explaining factors to social processes, where individuals act both within, 
and in relation to, social structures. To be able to apply such a model to the case, I first 
need to identify relevant structures and acts.  
Many actors can be relevant for this study, such as Syrian refugees, Egyptian 
citizens, refugees of other nationalities, the Egyptian state, media, charity organizations 
or UNHCR. In this study, the Syrian refugees are the primary focus, and the Syrian 
refugees are the main actors that will be examined, together with two Egyptian 
community workers that take action for the integration of Syrian refugees, who have 
also been interviewed. The policy of the Egyptian state, UNHCR, etcetera, are seen as 
structures. This is to limit the scope of this paper.  
A structure should be understood as a social system that (unconsciously) 
reconstructs – and perhaps consolidates – a present state. Lundquist (1984:5) mentions 
three analytical structures within which social processes can be studied: social, 
economic and political structures, and this chapter will now outline the analytical 
structures that are found relevant for immigrant integration: othering is seen as a social 
structure, the class structure as an economic structure and citizenship as a political 
structure. 
2.2.1 A social structure constructing a racial Other 
The existing theory in the studies of integration is to a high extent based on an 
anthropology that views cultural manifestations as a characteristic inseparable from the 
individual, and social categorization on cultural basis as inevitable. Hence, diversity is 
a ‘problem’ in every society that allows immigration. To be able to look beyond cultural 
diversity as a ‘natural’ source of conflict, a perspective that sees diversity as socially 
constructed could be useful.  
Edward Said’s Orientalism from 1978 is one of the most famous scholarly pieces on 
diversity as socially constructed. Said argues that ‘the Orient’ is constructed to 
substantiate an opposite to ‘the Occident’; to be able to define ourselves we also have 
to define what we are not.  In other words, ‘the Orient’ is constructed to substantiate 
an ‘Other’. ‘The Orient’ is as much a discursive construction as a geographical place; 
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the Others are presented as exotic and different, in fact even as incompatible with ‘us’ 
(Isin 2002; Ahmed 2006). The construction of ‘the Orient’ and a geographical 
otherness inevitably also constructs what Said calls ‘the Orientals’; the racial Others, 
who embody distance and constitutes a ‘there’, when whiteness in the Occident 
constitutes a ‘here’ (Ahmed 2006). Ahmed compares the social proximity that is the 
foundation for whiteness to the family. Parents search in their offspring not for any 
likeness, but for a specific likeness (“she has her father’s nose!”), that shows inheritance 
and belonging (2006:119-125). Similarly, color is a criteria that guarantees one’s 
inclusion in a social category – a ‘race’. Hence, ‘race’ is not a natural or given 
categorization of people, but socially constructed to impose a hierarchy. As belonging 
to ‘the Occident’ implies whiteness, ‘the Orient’ implies otherness. As Ahmed (2006) 
and many others have noted, whiteness is rather the absence of race than race, while 
absence of whiteness imposes race; racialization.  
The constructed Other has become subjected to racism, which, according to 
Balibar (1991a), rather fears cultural interbreeding than racial – racism is no longer 
based on ‘race’. In fact, since the abolishment of colonization, the main theme is not 
the superiority of one group over another, but the need to separate groups “to purify 
the social body, to preserve 'one's own' or 'our' identity from all forms of mixing, 
interbreeding or invasion” (p. 17). This sort of ‘new’ racism holds a contradiction as it 
on one hand is conservative and expects – and desires – cultures to be differentiated 
and static, but on the other expects assimilation to proceed integration for immigrated 
Europeans (p. 25).  
In Zizek’s understanding, modern racism has gone even further; to idealize the 
Other. The exoticized Other is no longer a savage, but an even better person than 
‘ourselves’ – someone to learn from. Already the colonial Euro centrism is based on 
idealizing the Other as a holder of hidden wisdom, that is available for ‘us’ to explore 
(McLaren 2001; Ahmed 2006). 
2.2.2 The economic structure: a class-based society 
Racial or ethnic othering cannot be studied without the notion of class, as Balibar 
(1991a), Wallerstein (1991), Ahmed (2006) and many others have pointed out. 
Wallerstein (1991:29-35) shows that the economic system has no drive for full 
integration – racism and segregation rather have a function to ensure stratification in 
the capitalist system and ensure a constant supply of desperate workers who accept 
low wages and poor working conditions, and to justify the very existence of a 
disadvantaged class, in contradiction to equal competition and equal rights for all. 
Furthermore, a system that is based on competition does not encourage solidarity. It 
is therefore no surprise that a racist party like the Swedish Democrats in Sweden gain 
much of their support from the less advantaged, such as persons with low education 
and income, even if their ideology lies closer to right-wing parties that usually do not 
enjoy support from these members of society (Holmberg 2007). When seeking for 
explanations to segregation, one should therefore consider the economic system as a 
possible factor.  
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As mentioned above, othering is a way to define persons who cannot be defined 
‘like us’: the Other is both what we are not, and what we are not but could be, as an 
available extension to us. The disadvantaged Other is a resource for the advantaged 
(Ahmed 2006:114 ff). In fact, the historical – colonial – racism was not based on 
nationalism, but on classism. The very notion of race did not appear until later, and 
then to distinguish between servants or slaves, and aristocrats or owners. This ‘class 
racism’ was later politically challenged – especially through the claims of the French 
revolution – when humans were seen as born equal, rather than born unequal (Balibar, 
1991b:206f). To justify inequality under such political circumstances, the political unit 
within which all human are equal had to be limited through citizenship (Isin 2002). 
Class differences were now to be understood as inequality but not as injustice. 
2.2.3 Citizenship as a political structure 
Bridget Anderson shows how the nation-state is a colonial construction that aims at 
excluding the colonized and the unwanted. Its borders are both physical, to limit a 
geographic space, but also metaphoric, to function “as filters, sorting out the desirable 
from the undesirable” (Anderson 2013:2; Vaughan-Williams 2009). Anderson (2013) 
understands society as a ‘community of value’, and its members as divided into those 
who share values and are either good citizens or tolerated citizens, and those who do 
not share values; failed citizens and non-citizens. As society is pictured as an united 
community, migrants (and other disadvantaged groups) are “at best contingently 
included, and (…) often overtly excluded.” (p. 29).  
The global structure of nation-states allows people to be right-holders only in a 
limited geographic space, and is at the core of the problem of international migrants. 
According to Anderson (2013) and Isin (2002) the right to be politically active and 
claim rights is conditional for some members of society, such as the criminal, 
unemployed, and immigrated, who depend on tolerance from citizens with 
unconditional rights. It should be pointed out that under such circumstances, we 
cannot talk about unconditional rights for all, but about conditional services available 
to those who carry out a specific performance. 
Citizenship is often translated into ‘membership’ in a state, and scholars debate 
whether it should be seen as a status or a practice, and as empowerment or domination, 
but all these interpretations give a limited understanding. Citizenship is a fluid concept 
that is enacted by “actors of citizenship [who] are not necessarily those who hold the 
status of citizenship. If we understand citizenship as an instituted subject-position, it 
can be performed or enacted by various categories of subjects (…)” (Isin 2009:370). 
Isin (2002) claims that every society constructs some of its members as outsiders 
and Others as an inevitable condition for constructing some as an elite and a ruling 
class of citizens (Isin 2002:280f). There is nothing like a harmonious society, and the 
more any leader tries to picture it as such, the more divided we can suspect it to be (p. 
29). Furthermore, the disadvantaged members of society tend to be pictured as 
excluded or as ‘outside society’, and social problems are associated with those excluded 
persons and not with society itself (Schinkel 2013).  
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Every society holds social groups, and group formations are acts of othering. This, 
as groups are built to contrast each other. Regardless if groups are hypothetical, thus 
created as a means for classification or self-definition, or real, as a result of political 
mobilization for a shared cause, groups constitute themselves in relation to each other 
(Isin 2002:25-35). In doing so, the members emphasize what is common as an act of 
submission to the group formation. In the case of citizens and Others, that means that 
citizenship can be seen as a “kind of identity (...) constitute[d] as virtuous, good, 
righteous, and superior, and differentiate[d] from strangers, outsiders and aliens” (Isin 
2002:35f), while non-citizens are constituted as immoral, criminal, dishonest, etcetera. 
Such a construction serves to justify political exclusion, economic marginalization, and 
racism. 
2.2.4 Acts for integration, acts of citizenship 
Lastly, we need a definition of an act. Isin (2009:378) defines an act, unlike an action, 
as a doing performed by an actor, that is purposive, that aims to make a difference, 
that has completion, and that ends with a new act. Furthermore, acts indicate relations. 
Isin (2009:378 ff) refers to Reinach, who interpret acts as expressions of the need for 
being heard.  Hence, every act is made by one or several actors, with the intention to 
get heard by someone else.  
We also need to know what acts can be called ‘acts of citizenship’. In Isin’s words, 
what comes to mind is “acts as voting, taxpaying and enlisting. But these are routinized 
social actions that are already instituted. By contrast, acts make a difference.” 
(2009:379). Acts of citizenship are acts which purpose is to claim rights, as citizenship 
implies rights. Hannah Arendt has a similar view and sees a political being as a being 
capable of acting. However, the political claims to rights raised especially by 
undocumented migrants and refugees in Europe, have highlighted the gap between 
citizenship as a membership in a state, and citizenship as a claim for rights – as these 
claims are not for citizenship status, but ‘only’ for rights (Isin 2009:380f). Isin criticizes 
Zizek, who claims that non-citizens broadening the very concept of politics to 
something bigger when they become political, and are to be understand as 
revolutionary (Zizek 1999, referred to by Isin 2002:277). Isin argues that non-citizens 
are constructed as Others when understood as revolutionary, which serves the 
Occidental interest. Rather, non-citizens should be understood as a part of the political 
as “[t]he political is not limited to an already constituted territory or its legal ‘subjects’: 
it always exceeds them.” (Isin, 2009: 370). 
When non-citizens act, they constitute themselves as holders of “the right to claim 
rights” (Isin 2009:371). With the definition of integration being equality, any act for 
integration becomes an act for equality. Thus, acting for integration means enacting 
the right to claim rights, and constructing oneself as an actor of citizenship. 
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3 Methodology 
In the first chapter I have already briefly argued for my choice of case; the case is 
relevant for the theoretical problem that is studied as it is characterized by uniformity 
– but the case is also relevant to study in itself. First, the Syrian refugee community in 
Egypt is in many ways characteristic for modern refugees. Unlike a hundred years ago, 
most refugees today live in an urban setting and not in camps (UNHCR 2015b). Most 
refugees also stay in the region of their departure state, often in poor neighboring 
states. In this perspective, the Syrian refugees in Egypt make up a representative case 
for a refugee population. Second, given the size of the refugee population – 4.4 million 
Syrians have fled to neighboring countries since the outbreak of the war in 2011 
(UNHCR 2015a) – and the unlikelihood that they will be able to return to Syria in any 
foreseeable future, it is also an important case to study. 
3.1 A qualitative analysis of interview material 
I have found a qualitative method of analysis most suitable for this study. The complex 
social processes that are at focus here may be active in interpersonal interactions, 
perhaps unconsciously, and may not be captured in surveys. A more suitable method 
of collection is that of in-depth interviews, which allows me to collect narratives of 
Syrian refugees living in Egypt. Four key persons in the Syrian community have been 
selected; they are community workers, volunteers in social projects and charity 
workers, as well as two Egyptian community workers taking action for the integration 
of the Syrian community. The key persons are expected to have a deeper understanding 
of not only their own, but also the general experience of being a Syrian refugee in 
Egypt, and they take action to improve the situation for the Syrians. Interviewing these 
actors allows me to identify both structures and acts for integration. 
The informants have been introduced to topics of conversation that relate to 
experiences of othering, economic exploitation and political exclusion. The meetings 
have been rather organic and the informants have been allowed to choose where to 
meet, and if they want to come alone or together with someone. As a result, two 
interviews were made in pairs; with the Syrian community workers Rima and Said, as 
well as with the Egyptian community workers May and Hadeer. Two interviews were 
conducted individually: with Rasha, who is chairperson for a Syrian NGO, and with 
Hanady, who is working with children at a Syrian community center. Two of the 
interviews, with Rima and Said and with Hanady, were conducted in Arabic. Even 
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though I speak Arabic, a native speaker joined to ensure that misunderstandings were 
avoided. All interviews were recorded. 
The analysis of the material aims at identifying experiences that conflicts or 
corresponds to the theoretical explanations. In accordance to the theoretical tool, the 
analysis has been divided into three areas: the social (othering), the economic (class) 
and the political. 
3.1.1 Reliability of informants 
The population at interest has been reached through UNHCR, which has contact with 
a great number of social initiatives, and which has hosted me during August and 
September 2015. It has been clear to the respondents that I am not a representative of 
UNHCR, and UNHCR has not contacted the respondents for me. I got the impression 
that the informants did speak freely – also when criticizing UNHCR – and I do not 
believe that the help of UNHCR has any implication for the reliability of the material.  
When talking about the government, many of the informants have also spoken 
surprisingly freely. However, almost all informants explicitly thank the government for 
hosting them in Egypt. This repeated statement stood in bright contrast to the criticism 
that was expressed at other times during the interviews, and I interpret the statement 
as fear for the government, rather than real thankfulness. I have reasons to believe that 
the critique to the government is stronger than what has been outspoken. One NGO 
director was interviewed, but refused to answer most of my questions and refused 
being recorded. Hence, his statements have not been used in this study. 
With this background, I have chosen only to use the informants’ first names and 
not the names of the NGOs and centers that they work for. This is to protect their 
identities. 
3.2 Abduction and the research process 
This thesis has been written during a long period of time and it has been a fairly organic 
process. When formulating the research question and constructing the theoretical 
framework I expected that construction of diversity though othering would be the 
(main) reason for the Syrian refugees’ difficulties to integrate in Egypt, but at an early 
stage of the field trip it emerged to me that that explanation was far too limited. During 
the first two interviews, with Hanady as well as with Rima and Said, the importance of 
political and economic factors was highlighted. This abduction brought a somewhat 
new perspective to me and led me to adjust the research design and the theoretical 
framework. During the interviews that were conducted later, with Rasha as well as well 
May and Hadeer, I adjusted my questions to what I had learned. This does not mean 
that those interviews are more important, but the answers fit more precisely into the 
theoretical context, hence these informants are more frequently quoted in the analysis. 
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3.3 Studying structures 
Structures are theoretical constructions, and in that sense not “real”. They only exist 
as long as they function; at the point in history when none claims to be limited or in 
any sense affected by a structure, we cannot claim that it exists. As a consequence, we 
can only know about structures as we experience them; there is no objective way to 
measure or study them. With that background, my methodological position must be 
one of interpretation. I cannot find universal descriptions or explanations, but only 
seek an understanding of my material that is theoretically consistent, and in that 
perspective valid (Hollis 1994).  
3.3.1 Context and generalizability 
Much of my contribution is based on the empirical material that I have collected 
through interviews. My interpretation of that material is also a result of observations 
made during my field trip to Cairo. As will be highlighted later, the political and social 
climate is highly inconstant and the interpretation that I make now, as well as the 
material that I have collected, should be understood as a result of the context and time 
in which the study was made. 
The findings that are highlighted in the following chapters are based on claims that 
have been made by several, and sometimes all, of the informants. Despite the small 
number of informants, the informants have often spoken not only about themselves 
but about Syrians around them, in general, and appeared to view themselves as 
spokespersons for a community. The great insight of the general situation of Syrian 
refugees in Egypt that the informants hold, as well as the recurrence of claims, allow 
me to assume that their perception of the situation is shared by others (Payne & 
Williams 2005). I cannot judge whether the material that I have collected in Cairo can 
be used to understand integration in another setting, whether at other places in Egypt, 
in other countries in the region, or in Europe. However, the insights that I have 
reached could be used as a starting point for further research on integration in any 
setting. 
3.4 Operationalization of terms 
Othering has been operationalized though discussions about the differences between 
Egyptians and Syrians, relation with Egyptians and other refugee communities, 
possibilities to have social relations with Egyptians, and treatment in public spaces and 
by officials. The class structure has been examined as experiences of the living standard 
in Egypt, Syrian refugees’ living standard compared to Egyptians’ and to other refugee 
communities, experiences of the labor market, experiences of the education sector, the 
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material needs of the community. The political has been discussed in terms of 
expectations on the Egyptian state, possibility to take (political) action, willingness to 
talk about politics and the government, self-perception of being a rights-holder in 
Egypt, and the consequences of political turmoil in Egypt for the community.  
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4 Result 
Through the empirical case study, I have been able to reveal a number of factors that 
could explain failed integration, other than ‘diversity’. This chapter will present the 
result of the empirical study, divided into three sections analyzing three aspects of 
integration: social, economic and political integration. Every section first examines the 
narratives about the social, economic or political structures. Second, every section 
examines acts of social, economic and political integration. 
4.1 Social integration or othering? 
Unlike what I had first expected, none of the Syrian refugees that I have interviewed 
have reported hostility or discrimination in their relations with Egyptian citizens, and 
none thought that they were socially excluded or alienated. When asked what the 
relations with the Egyptian public are like, Rima and Said answered shortly: “Good” 
and “no, no, that is fine - they love us. I mean, they Egyptian people love the Syrians.” 
Only the Egyptian community workers May and Hadeer saw social exclusion as a 
factor in the poor integration of the Syrian refugees, and reported what can be 
interpreted as difference making though othering. May gave an example:  
You find all those posts on Facebook: ‘I’ve had this Syrian carpenter come 
working for me and he was amazingly hard working and his work has incredible. 
He was much, much better than Egyptian carpenters. Why can’t Egyptian 
carpenters be as good as Syrian carpenters?’ (…) that comparison: Syrian wives 
are so amazing, they are so beautiful, they are so… what?! Who you antagonizing 
– Egyptian carpenters and Egyptian wives and whatever?  
What May talked about is at the core of othering. The characteristics of a person 
from Syria is interpreted as a Syrian characteristic, when it could be more reasonable to 
understand it as a characteristic of carpenters from a certain business or with a certain 
technique of carpeting. In this case, othering does not have racist tendencies in 
Balibar’s understanding; it does not necessarily seek to ‘purify’ one perceived group 
and it does not impose hierarchy – at least not in the favor of the local population. 
Rather, it idealizes the Other, as claimed by Zizek (McLaren, 2001), possibly, to justify 
their exploitation. Othering also appears to function as a way to define another. The 
informants experienced being perceived as belonging to a Syrian group, and they also 
defined others as either included or excluded from group. Hanady was keen to point 
out that “I am Syrian, [even if] I speak very good Egyptian”. Despite being careful to 
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categorize people into the right national group, none of the informants were able to 
tell the difference between Syrians and Egyptians, when asked. 
This is not without complication. First, group formation in itself is an act of 
othering, as the group members emphasize the common and thus the difference 
between members and non-members (Isin 2002). Second, if we define each other as 
members of a perceived group, the perceived (or even expected) characteristics of that 
group are translated into the characteristics of every member of that group. Just as 
Entzinger (2014) means that multiculturalist policies tend to accept inequality 
translated into ‘culture’, othering as a way of definition could possibly function to 
justify inequality and difference in opportunities, interpreted as the Other’s way of life. 
That the Syrian carpenter in May’s example was so hard working could be understood 
as an expression of their culture, but could also be a result of poverty and desperation 
to find work. 
Third, if all Syrians are grouped together, what are the implications for security or 
solidarity? When May was asked about her vision for the Syrian refugees in Egypt she 
put her hopes to “internal mobilization and the support system internally” and hoped 
“that this becomes another layer of support as the [Syrians] who started and are doing 
OK or very well, that they can start and support [other Syrians]”. In the long run, such 
a separate support system would imply something like a social apartheid state. In fact, 
this is what the situation is heading towards in many sectors: there are “Syrian” 
neighborhoods such as “Little Damascus”, Syrian schools and Syrian community 
centers. 
It appears that othering is not only imposed on the subject, but could also be 
enacted by oneself, as seen in a reference to sexual harassment made by May. 
Harassment is a problem for all girls in Egypt, but when a Syrian girl becomes a victim 
to sexual harassment it is interpreted as harassment towards the Syrian community, 
and “when you come to a new country, and then this happens and you’re already 
vulnerable, you don’t feel you’re home” (May). 
4.1.1 Struggling for integration, acting for othering 
Othering through difference making and group formation appears to be active not 
only in the narratives of the informants, but also in the acts they take in their daily lives 
and in their struggle for integration. None of the informants expressed any interest in 
socially integrating, despite reporting no bad experiences of the Egyptian public. Rima 
and Said spoke positively about the café they had chosen as a meeting point, as a place 
that gathered almost only Syrians. None of the Syrians that I spoke to ran any projects 
that aimed at bringing the two nationalities closer. When Hanady, who is responsible 
for activities for children in a community center, was asked if she targeted only Syrian 
or also children of other nationalities, she simply answered that “we don’t have a 
problem [if children of other nationalities want to join us]”. When informants were 
asked if they wanted to become Egyptian and gain Egyptian nationality in case they 
had to stay in Egypt for long, only Rasha took the question seriously. Hanady seemed 
offended by the question, then said “residency would be great, but nationality?”, and 
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laughed. A possible explanation is that the Syrian community is big enough to support 
itself, and perhaps the community expects their stay in Egypt to be temporary; there is 
no ‘need’ to socially integrate with the Egyptians. 
May and Hadeer were the only informants that actively worked for social 
integration, by bringing Syrian and Egyptian children together and educating them 
about their shared cultural heritage “to address issues of alienation (…) and accepting 
the other, on both sides” (May), though they were only doing so after being contracted 
by UNHCR. 
It should be pointed out that the small interest in social integration is not necessarily 
a reflection of an unwillingness to socially integrate, but a reflection of a more 
pragmatic strategy. I asked Hanady if the goal of the program for children was that 
they would be able to enter the Egyptian education system, or if they were to receive 
separate education with a Syrian curriculum, and she answered: 
We have two goals: First, to address special need that the children have because 
of what they have went through, but secondly, we live in Egypt so of course we 
have to prepare the child to live in the situation where he is. It doesn’t work that 
we are left behind for all our lives. 
Also May, who works with social integration only, believed that social integration is 
not the most urgent need of the Syrian refugees in Egypt: 
[Some refugees have] a direr situation, do you really want to go to talk with them 
about history, or just fulfill their basic needs?   
It appears that othering is active both through difference making and through group 
formation. The Syrian group is both what Isin (2002) calls a hypothetical group, as it 
is constructed to define oneself and another, but it is also a real group, that serves to 
address shared problems and needs specific to its members. 
4.2 Integration and the class structure 
The Syrians that flew to Egypt during the first years of the Syrian crisis were relatively 
well off. Unlike the Syrians in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, they arrived by airplane, 
had passports, and some opened shops, restaurants and businesses. A walk through 
downtown or any of the better-off neighborhoods of Cairo gives the impression that 
Syrian shops pop up as mushroom – and they are doing well. However, statistics of 
the socio-economic situation of the Syrian refugees registered by UNHCR gives a 
different picture. 70 % of the 200 000 registered Syrian refugees were surveyed, and 
87 % were found to survive with less than 592 Egyptian pounds (approximately 66 
Euro) per month, which is the minimum expenditure basket for Egypt, and 60 % 
survived with less than half that sum (Tan, 2015). All informants in this study have 
also reported that poverty is one of their biggest problem, along with the lack of work 
permits, which leads to poverty. However, the information about the poverty of the 
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Syrian refugees has not reached the Egyptian public, and the community worker May 
sees both advantages and disadvantages: while the Syrians could have received more 
support if people were more aware of their actual situation, the Egyptians would also 
have felt more competition over resources if they were aware of the Syrians’ needs. 
In my conversation with Rasha, who runs an NGO, the shock of moving to Egypt 
appeared to be not a culture shock but a class shock: “Syrians who were not initially 
poor got to stay in poor areas”; “they were out of their place”. Their new living 
situation offered a new lifestyle – especially for the women, who “do not work in Syria 
(…) so they are provided with everything”. Rasha described a life with drivers, service 
delivery and servants, similar to that of high class Egyptians. But “life in Egypt is harsh, 
it’s different. Women work here, women do lots of things here. They are like fighters. 
You know, Syrian women are not, and they have lots of family. Now, the woman has 
to go out and work”. The conflict appeared between high-class Syrians and lower-class 
Egyptians and appears to me as a class conflict, but is interpreted by the community 
as a cultural difference. According to Rasha, the Syrians that have ended up in poor 
neighborhoods complain about harassment, but none of the informants that I have 
met (and that live in neighborhoods that reflect their class background) have made 
such complaints. However, it lies outside the scope of this paper to speculate as to the 
possible integration of Syrians from working-class backgrounds. 
Another shock, which was brought up by both May and Rima, is that of the poor 
services offered in the Egyptian public sector. 
4.2.1 Integrating into the ‘right’ class 
When talking about poverty, all the informants have been well aware that their 
expectation is to be better off than most Egyptians, and much better off than refugees 
of other nationalities in Egypt. Despite the reported harassment of Syrians in poorer 
areas, the reluctance also appears among the Syrians. They are, again according to 
Rasha, “out of their place”. Rasha’s NGO has therefore run a project that consisted 
of paying the rents of Syrian families living in the very poor area Masaken Othman, to 
allow them to move to richer but more expensive areas. When I asked why she made 
no attempt to improve the area as a whole and help also Egyptian residents, she 
answered that she did not consider herself responsible for them, as “for the Egyptians, 
this is their environment, their community”. The complaints over economic problems 
were not about being too poor, but about being poorer that one should be; only May 
and Hadeer were critical of economic inequality, all other informants were critical of 
economic injustice – and the poverty of some was considered just. The struggle for 
economic integration did not aim at erasing class differences, but to integrate into one’s 
‘right’ class – which indicates that there is something like a ‘right’ class. 
Both Rasha and Rima were running trainings to provide Syrians with skills that 
would make them more attractive to the labor market, but none of them thought that 
this was a real solution to the Syrians’ economic problems, it could only help some to 
get underqualified jobs and a basic income to survive with. The solution that they really 
needed was work permits that would allow stable employment in their fields of 
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expertise. In the absence of such, they depend on informal and underqualified jobs. 
UNHCR has also found that an increasing number of Syrian refugees in Egypt use 
‘negative coping strategies’ such as begging, illegal, exploitative or dangerous labor, and 
forced early marriage (Tan, 2015). According to Wallerstein (1991), the economic 
system pushes the immigrated to poverty, because it needs a supply of people that are 
desperate enough to take jobs that none else wants, perhaps because they have a poor 
background, no education, etcetera. In this case, that explanation has limited validity 
as the supply of desperate workers in Egypt is almost endless. The exclusion from the 
labor market is not a result of the market or the refugees’ inability to compete with the 
local labor force, but of political reform that does not allow work permits for refugees. 
4.3 Integration and the political 
When talking about integration into the political, it appears that the integration into 
the different spheres are closely linked together. When asked about their visions for 
the Syrian community, all informants wished for work permits. All informants also 
reported great frustration over the temporary residence permits that have to be 
renewed every six months, a process that takes two month, and hence has to be started 
anew every four months. Constantly applying for new visas gives a feeling of 
uncertainty and makes it difficult to settle down and feel secure; both Rasha and Rima 
claimed that Egypt is a transit country for refugees. According to Zohry (2003) Egypt 
is, historically, not a receiving but rather a sending state of migrants, and the Egyptian 
policy on border control and migration management is shaped by these characteristics. 
As an example, entry visas are easy to obtain upon arrival on the border, but permission 
from the army is required (for men) to leave the country (Middle East Institute 2010). 
After the regime shift in 2013, the immigration policy changed, and there is now an 
entry visa requirement for Syrians, but many still get arrested and detained for trying 
to depart irregularly (Smith 2015). 
All informants have differentiated between the Syrians’ situation before and after 
the regime shift from the 30th of June 2013. The overthrown government of the 
Muslim Brotherhood had expressed great support for the Syrian opposition and some 
Syrian refugees were thought to support the Muslim Brotherhood. After the regime 
shift, a negative media rhetoric including hate speech and threats targeted at not only 
the Muslim Brotherhood, but also the whole Syrian refugee community (Ayoub & 
Khallaf 2014:21). None of the informants of this study reported as harsh conditions 
as were described by Ayoub & Khallaf, who found that the refugees faced hostility in 
all contact with the Egyptian society after the 30th of June, including inter-personal 
relations with Egyptians. However, when the immigration policy was replaced together 
with the political leaders, the atmosphere changed. Said tells:  
During Mohamed Morsi’s time there was a lot of help and money from the 
Egyptians. (…) After the Egyptians made him leave and fought the Brotherhood 
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and prisoned the communities that were affiliated with the Brotherhood, the 
help stopped. But what did the Syrians do for the help to stop? 
Despite the relations with the public that seem to have returned to normal, the 
informants have brought up three lasting effects of the 30th of June crisis: First, the 
government forcibly closed many of the NGOs working for Syrians, and thereby 
removed much of their support system and left them even more vulnerable. Second, 
the visa requirements made it impossible to come to Egypt legally. The Syrians that 
continue to arrive in Egypt, travel via Sudan and enter illegally. Hence, they stay in 
Egypt without residency permits and without rights. Visa requirements also make it 
difficult to reunite families that were separated before 30th of June. Third, most 
informants have reported a feeling of unsafety due to the unstable political situation, 
which pushes many to try to depart irregularly from Egypt (Rollins 2014), as explained 
by Rasha: 
They always expect that you know to be thrown out or put in jail because of the 
unstable economic (…) and political climate in Egypt. (…) They are not safe. 
The Egyptians are leaving. [The Syrians] came into a political issue, [and] the 
Egyptians themselves are not staying [in Egypt]. 
Much of the political instability has nothing to do with immigration, but with the power 
struggle between the government and the ousted. Immigration policy is rather a way 
for the military leadership to raise its profile, as different as possible from the ousted. 
To construct a common enemy – strangers, outsiders, terrorists – is also a way to unite 
the population, especially in times of crisis and conflict (Isin 2002:29).  The overthrow 
of the Muslim Brotherhood regime that gained massive public support, revealed the 
political instability and changeability of the public support. The perception of the 
Syrian refugees has changed from that of guests, to that of criminals, aliens and 
enemies. In Andersons’s (2013) terms, the Syrians were excluded from the (perceived) 
community of values, but not necessarily because they changed, but because the values 
changed.  
The feeling of unsafety is also reflected in the expectations and/or experiences of 
public officials. Rima says: 
If I have all my papers in order, and my residence permit, and a police officer 
stopped me – he will finish with me quickly, like this: [clapping hands, as if 
removing dust]. (…) There are no rights, no rights for the Syrians – ever. 
It appears strange that the relation with the general public is positive or at least neutral, 
while the representatives of the government are perceived so negatively. Why is that? 
The continued conversation gives a lead: 
Rima: “Here, they don’t deal with Syrians as if they were humans.”  
Said: “They don’t deal with the [Egyptian] people as if they were humans!” 
[Laughs] 
After some conversation, it appears that the informants are aware that all what they 
suffer from is not targeted towards them as Syrians, but that nearly all people in Egypt 
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suffer from oppression, poverty and other hardship. Their claim is not about a poor 
reception of refugees, but about a poorly managed state in general. 
The informants reported being disappointed because they expected to improve 
their lives, or at least to keep their previous standard of living, and they are not able to 
do so partly because they have limited rights as refugees, but also because opportunities 
and living standard are poorer in Egypt than in Syria. Zizek (2015) makes a similar 
conclusion about the refugees in Europe: “one can observe here the paradox of utopia: 
precisely when people find themselves in poverty, distress and danger, and one would 
expect that they would be satisfied by a minimum of safety and well-being, the absolute 
utopia explodes.“ 
4.3.1 Acts of citizenship 
In the light of the reasoning about assimilation earlier, one can expect that refugees 
that get engaged in local affairs and politics would be better integrated than others, but 
Syrian refugees in Egypt seem to face much of their problems because of refugees’ 
engagement in what is considered ‘Egyptian affairs’ (Marroushi 2013; Ayoub & Khallaf 
2014). None of the Syrians that I have spoken with have expressed any political 
preferences, but they were well aware of the rumors about the community’s affiliation 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, and there seem to be a consensus about this explanation 
to the sudden hostility towards them. It has also been clear to them that it is impossible 
to take political action, unless it directly relates to their own needs as Syrian refugees. 
Given the political situation in Egypt, it is understandable that none have criticized 
the government during the interviews. However, I have felt the frustration over the 
little support from the government, and the closing down NGOs and charities, 
expressed in body language or ‘between the lines’. Even if much of the (direct) 
complaints have been about UNHCR or nonprofit organizations, most of the 
informants to this study have (indirectly) questioned what society they are trying to 
integrate into, and it is clear that their vision is not only to live as well as the Egyptians 
do, but to create, or find, a much better society. That they romanticize Syria, and the 
life they believe that they could have lived elsewhere, appears to play a role in shaping 
their expectations. 
The informants have differentiated between the needs of Egyptians, which they 
perceive as the responsibility of the government, and the needs of the Syrians, which 
they regard as their own responsibility as NGO- and community workers. Caring for 
the protection of the ‘own’ community is a logical consequence of their expectations, 
and it is also a political act. When society claims no responsibility, the informants have 
felt a responsibility to provide themselves with rights. As explained in the theoretical 
frame work, to ask for a right is also a right. Acting for integration and improving ones 
rights is also a way to constitute oneself as a rights-holder, which, according to Isin 
(2002) is to constitute oneself as an (informal) citizen. In the absence of formal rights, 
the Syrians in Egypt provide themselves with rights: the absence of work permits does 
not stop them from working informally, poor education services does not stop them 
from educating their own children, and strict emigration policy does not stop them 
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from trying to depart illegally. Such acts, that deliberately break the rules but (indirectly) 
aim at changing the rules, are acts of citizenship. 
In my conversation with Rasha it became clear that she was aware of, and actively 
considering, the potential political consequences of her work; she recalled a 
conversation with a friend, also a community worker, who argued that the charity 
should stop working in order to push the government to take responsibility and 
support the refugees. Rasha had answered that not only the refugees, but the whole 
country survives because of charity. Closing down the center would change nothing 
but the lives of the refugees, and their ability to act. Her statement shows both that 
she expects nothing from the government, and that there is an underlying political 
ambition in her work. 
The Egyptian informants – May and Hadeer – had a more ideological approach to 
migration. They were critical to the class structure as well as the idea of nations, states 
and borders. Instead of seeing the Syrians as aliens, they taught the children about a 
borderless world and one united humanity.  
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5 Conclusions 
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, I have sought to understand the 
integration process by identifying the obstacles for integration, and the efforts made 
to overcome them. I have used a structure-actor model to distinguish between actors 
and the structures within which they act, and with the help of the empirical study I 
have been able to identify three discriminatory structures that push for inequality. The 
social structure constructs the immigrated as Others and strangers, not welcome and 
not ‘home’ in the receiving society, but the explanation that I expected to find appeared 
to have limited relevance. Othering alone cannot explain why the Syrians refugees are 
poorly integrated in Egypt, but it runs like a thread through the whole analysis. The 
informants experienced being pushed down the social ladder, but as some of the Syrian 
refugees in Egypt are successful and rich (and those Syrians are more visible), the 
general expectation is that all Syrians are rich. The political climate that is hostile 
towards the Syrian refugees targeted them as a group and not as individuals, regardless 
of their political activities or preferences. The informants also perceived problems in 
their new society as specific to them; a problem like sexual harassment – that all women 
in Egypt suffer from – was perceived as an attack on the refugee community and made 
the Syrian refugees feel unwelcome and pushed away. The acts that the informants 
took towards integration were also acts of othering. Social support and services were 
offered by Syrian refugees to other Syrian refugees, and the community was separated 
from the Egyptian public. The informants both experienced alienation and alienated 
themselves from the Egyptians. 
I have found conflicting positions between the immigrated and the society they try 
to integrate into; the immigrated act for integration but the society has a drive for 
segregation. With this perspective, we need a new vocabulary of integration. So, how 
should the integration of the Syrian refugees in Egypt be understood? I suggest that 
the integration process should be understood as political struggle for rights. 
5.1 Integration as a political struggle for rights 
When integration is defined as equality, any act for integration becomes an act for 
equality. Calling for integration means calling for improved opportunities and better 
living standard for the underprivileged. Hence, integration should be understood as a 
political struggle. Furthermore, when acting (politically), one expresses a need for being 
heard. When an immigrated member of society asks to be heard, s/he makes a 
democratic request. Calling for change and asking to be heard means enacting ‘the 
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right to have rights’. Hence, integration should be understood as a political struggle for 
rights. 
Accordingly, integration does not necessarily imply thankfulness or admiration to 
the society one struggles to integrate into. On the contrary, the political struggle that 
the integration process makes up, could possibly give rise to further critique. The 
integration act is a critical practice.  
However, acting for equality does not necessarily imply having an ideology that goes 
against any inequality. As noted earlier, in reference to Wallerstein (1991), the 
economic system has no drive for full integration as it does not have a drive for 
equality, and it is somewhat misleading to talk about integrating into a system that per 
definition is disintegrated. Economic integration does not necessarily aim at equality 
but rather at justice. When claiming that the immigrated become low-class because of 
injustice, one also recognizes the class structure and the poverty of some (other) poor 
as just. This was expressed by the informants as a will to integrate in their ‘right’ class, 
and an indifference towards poverty that was seen as just – which indicates that there 
is a ‘right’ class. Class difference was not seen as unjust economic inequality, and 
accordingly, sexual harassment was not understood as unjust gender oppression.  
5.2 Structures, actors and the freedom of human 
Acts take place within structures, and structures shape acts; the social structure that 
divides people into groups, shapes social action to appear within the constructed 
group. On the other hand, acts also shape structures. The informants were restricted 
from engaging in ‘Egyptian affairs’, but they also constructed themselves as responsible 
only for other Syrians, and did not take action for Egyptians who had similar problems 
as themselves.  
In an earlier chapter I referred to Hollis (1994), who questioned whether acts shape 
structures or structures shape acts, which comes down to whether human is free and 
able to carry out social change, or not. From my perspective, they are interrelated and 
reconstruct each other, often unconsciously, and perhaps in spite of the actors’ 
intentions. This was apparent when the informants talked about their social lives that 
were isolated from that of Egyptians, which possibly had consequences also for their 
access to other parts of society. To make possible social change through social action, 
perhaps actors must be conscious of the structures. 
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5.3 Managing diversity has nothing to do with 
integration 
As outlined in the introduction, the preposition of the current integrations regime is 
that integration is a natural process that happens by itself, if the population is uniform. 
I have reasons to challenge that conclusion.  
Firstly, assimilation does not necessarily lead to integration. The difference between 
Syrians and Egyptians was not at all about culture; none of the informants could tell 
what the (cultural) difference between Syrians and Egyptians was. Despite this, the 
informants defined themselves, and experienced being defined by others, by their 
nationality. The construction of a Syrian refugee community was both practical, around 
a shared cause to support the community, and symbolic, as a way to define each other. 
When some refugees became (too) engaged in ‘Egyptian affairs’, the defining border 
was removed and the support to the community stopped. It is not at all given that 
adjusting to the local population makes integration easier, even the opposite could be 
true. It appears like assimilation is not demanded when it is possible, or not ‘needed’. 
But in a context where skin color, language skills or religion can still function as 
defining characteristics, assimilation can be requested. Though, it should not be 
understood as a real wish for uniformity, but a strategy to create a desirable white norm 
and a second class that will never succeed to fulfill that norm. The critical response to 
the western demand on impossible assimilation has become to act as if assimilation 
has worked; the white anti-racism movement rewards the racialized by not ‘seeing’ skin 
color – a strategy that confirms that the white norm is desirable. 
Second, my findings also give me reasons to claim that integration should not be 
understood as a ‘natural’ process. What happens ‘naturally’ is rather the opposite: 
segregation. The prevalent perspective appears to give a limited understanding of the 
integration process. By focusing on ‘cultural’ diversity, the social structure is active, but 
not necessarily challenged. As already found by Kamali et al (2006), the integration 
policy that focuses on ‘culture’ possibly even preserves the social structure, while the 
economic and political structures are not noticed. By admitting the discriminatory 
structures that are active in society, they integration policy could possibly move more 
actively towards equality. 
When talking about integration policy, one should consider contextual differences. 
Most research on integration appears to be conducted in a western context, but this 
study clearly shows that prevalent theoretical findings are not always applicable on 
another context. As an example, previous research appears to assume that the 
immigrated has a poorer background than the population of the receiving state, and 
that the receiving state is a rich democracy. Hence, the immigrated make up a ‘natural’ 
under-class, and the local population a ruling class. On the contrary, most of the 
world’s refugees end up in poor and undemocratic countries in the region of their 
origin, and we know little about how their integration does – and could – work. 
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